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In attempting to understand the philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche
one is immediately faced with the task of resolving the prima /acie
inconsistencies in his views on freedom. On the one hand, Nietzsche
claims that we do not have freedom of will and that, consequently, we
are not accountable for our actions. The following passage is
representative of many:
The history of the moral sensations is the history of an error, the error of accountability,
which rests on the error offreedom ofwill. ( ) No one is accountable for his
deed, no one for his nature; to judge is the same thing as to be unjust. This applies when the
individual judges hirnself. The proposition is as clear as daylight, and yet here everyone
prefers to retreat back into the shadows and untruth: from fear of the consequences.!
On the other hand, Nietzsche emphasizes that the significance of the
death of God is that it frees us into an open sea in which an infinite
number of choices lie before uso He says,
We philosophers and 'free spirits' in fact feel at the news that the 'old God is dead' as if
illuminated by a new dawn; our heart overflows with gratitude, astonishment,
presentiment, expectation-at last the horizon seems to us again free, ....2
Furthermore, his characterization of freedom in The Twilight 0/ the
Idols suggests that the will is free; that freedom is a realizable
possibility. He asks:
For what is freedom? That one has the will to self-responsibility. Freedom means that the
manly instincts ... dominate over other instincts. The free man is a warrior. 3
For Nietzsche, the powerful strong willed individual would seem to be
able to set goals for himself, alone and in isolation, and has the power to
overcome the 0 bstacles that stand in the way of achieving those goals.
He gives Julius Caesar as an example of someone who has achieved a
certain measure of freedom. Thus, there is textual evidence to support
the charge that Nietzsche both affirms and denies freedom of will.
There is a second difficulty concerning Nietzsche's views on freedom
that also deserves attention. In Beyond Good and Evil Nietzsche
maintains that the will is neither free nor non-free. Nietzsche expresses
this view in a passage I shall quote at length:
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The desire for ~~freedomofwill" in the superlative, metaphysical sense, such as still holds
sway, unfortunately, in the minds of the half-educated, the desire to bear the entire and
ultimate responsibility for one's actions oneself, and to absolve God, the world, ancestors,
chance, and society therefrom, involves nothing less than to be precisely this causa sui. If
anyone should find out in this manner the crass stupidity of the celebrated conception of
"free will" and put it out of his head altogether, :I[ beg of hirn to carry his "enlightenment" a
step further, and also put out of his head the contrary of this monstrous conception of
"free will": I mean "non-free will," which is tantamount to a misuse of cause and effect.
( ) The "non-free will" is mythology; in real life it is only a
question of strong and weak wills.4
How can the will be neither free nor unfree? And, more generally, how
are we to understand Nietzsche's enigmatic remarks concerning
freedom? The main aim of this paper is to answer these questions and in
so doing provide a coherent and consistent account ofNietzsche's views
on freedom. I shall proceed by first discussing the conception of
freedom that Nietzsche rejects together with his reasons for rejecting it.
Then I shall offer an interpretation of Nietzsche's positive views on
freedom, and finally I shall relate his view of freedom to his view on
values. In that connection I shall atternpt to show, once again, that the
paradox inherent in Nietzsche's remarks on freedom and value can be
overcome.
I. NIETZSCHE'S NEGATIVI~VIEW OF FREEDOM
The conception of freedom that Nit~tzsche rejects is founded upon a
mistaken view ofthe self. According to this radically defective view, the
self is an indivisible, eternal, monad or substratum that retains its
identity through time. This subject, ego, or substance is construed as an
agent or a doer that lies behind the deed that it causes. Nietzsche
expresses this position in the following passage: "The subject:
interpreted from within ourselves so that the ego counts as a substance,
as the cause of all deeds, as a doer."5 And in another he says:
Andjust exactly as people separate the lightning from its flash, and interpret the latter as a
thing done, as the working of a subject which is called lightning, so also does the popular
morality separate strength from the expression of strength, as though behind the strong
man there existed some indifferent neutral substratum, which enjoyed a caprice and
option as to whether or not it should express strength.6
On this view, the agent is endowed with a simple faculty of free will that
enables it to choose or not to choose to perform an action without itself
being acted upon by any causes outside or behind it. Thus, a free act or
deed is one performed by a substance qua agent that lies outside the
realm of causality and the net of scientific predictability.
In denying free will Nietzsche is denying that the will or self is an
entity existing outside the habit, desire, reflection, and act, that together
constitute the deed. For Nietzsche,
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there is no such substratum, there is no "being" behind doing, working, becoming~ "the
doer" is a mere appendage to the action. The action is everything. 7
To be sure, the self exists but not as a mere block of identity distinct
from its concrete activities; not as a substance whose freedom is
antecedently possessed. Rather, on Nietzsche's view, the doer or subject
and deed are one, and its freedom is something that must come to be,
mature, and grow. As he says:
No "substance," rather something that in itself strives after greater strength, and that
wants to "preserve" itself only indirectly (it wants to surpass itself-).8
And he continues:
My hypothesis: The subject as multiplicity.9
We have here an important beginning in our attempt to understand
Nietzsche's positive view of freedom, but before developing it let us
return to the reasons for his negative attitude toward the substantialist
doctrine of free will.
Nietzsche attacks the doctrine of freedom of will because he believes
that, as traditionally conceived, it is internally inconsistent. It implies
that we both are and are not accountable and punishable for our
actions. The overall structure ofhis argument may be stated as follows:
(1) An agent can be held responsible for an action only if the agent
acted intentionally or for some reason, and not unconsciously or
under compulsion.
(2) No act of free will is intentional.
(3) Therefore, no agent can be held responsible or punishable for an
act of free will.
If defenders of the substantialist conception of free will are committed
to (3) then it can easily be shown that a contradiction follows. For those
who defend free will accept as axiomatic that
(4) All agents are responsible for actions done freely, and, under
certain conditions, punishable for actions done freely.
Thus, together with (3) the doctrine of free will entails that
(5) Agents are and are not responsible and, under certain conditions,
are and are not punishable for their own free acts of will.
A doctrine of freedom that arrives at that conclusion Nietzsche rejects
as absurd. Let us look more closely at the crucial steps (1) and (2) to see
if his rejection is justified.
First consider the textual evidence for step (1). Nietzsche says:
People who judge and punish as a profession try to establish in each case whether an
ill-doer is at all accountable for his deed, whether he was able to employ his intelligence,
whether he acted for reasons and not unconsciously or under compulsion. If he is
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punished, he is punished for having preferred the worse reasons to the better: which he
must therefore have known. 1o
For defenders of free-will, a necessary condition of responsibility or
accountability is that the perpetrator could have deliberated and
provided reasons for or against the deed before performing it. In other
words, the ability to make a purposeful or rational decision in which
motives do playa part is a necessary condition of responsibility. Thus,
an agent who is unable to distinguish between good and bad motives for
his action would not be held responsible. Furthermore, if we can
distinguish good and bad reasons or motives, and if we prefer bad
reasons or bad motives over good on(~s, then our deed is one for which
we are not only responsible but punishable as welle
An example might help. Suppose a woman has to decide whether or
not to have an affair with her neighbor's husband. She knows that it is
not right because it goes against her religious beliefs, and yet she is
motivat(~d to have the affair by what she considers, fronl her religious
perspective, to be an evil motive, namely, self-interest. The final choice
she makes is one for which she is responsible because she deliberated
and based her decision on reasons. Punishment would be justified, only
if she intentionally chooses the bad motive to govern her action. At this
point the question that troubles Nietzsche is "Whence comes the
decision when the scales are weighted with good and bad motives?"
Alternatively, "How can anyone intentionally be less intelligent than he
has to be"? 11 The response to these questions leads us to a justification
ofNietzsche's claim that (2) no act offree-will is intentional, which is, of
course, the heart of the argument.
The defenders of "free-will" maintain that our choice of bad motives
over good ones comes,
Not from error, from blindness, not from an external nor from an internal complusion
.... Whence? one asks again and again. And here one calls 'free-will' to one's aid: it is
pure willfulness which is supposed to decide, an impulse is supposed to enter within which
motive plays no part, in which the deed, arising out ofnothing, occurs as a miracle."12
Let us be clear about the view of"free-will" that Nietzsche is attempting
to reduce to absurdity. There are two main aspects of this conception:
First, there exists a self, an agent, that retains its strict identity through
time, without temporal parts, and is distinct from the events or
happenings that constitute its history. Second, this substance or agent
has the capacity to assert its will uncaused or uninfluenced by its
knowledge, environment, history, and heredity. Can the existence of
"free-will" in the sense just defined ever justify the right to punish?
According to Nietzsche the answer is emphatically no.
Recall that the first condition ofall punishment is that the perpetrator
ofthe deed acted intentionally, i.e., on the basis ofreasons. However, a
substantialist act offree-will is ultimately unintentionalbecause it is not
influenced or caused by reasons, motives, environment, or anything
else. An act offree will is a purely arbitrary, whimsical act arising out 0/
nothing: "a deed without a 'for that reason', without motive, without
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origin, something purposeless and non-rational." 13 Therefore, Nietzsche
concludes, "You adherents of 'free-will' have no right to punish, or to
hold a person responsible, your own principles deny you that right! "14
On Nietzsche's own view offreedom a person is responsible. Indeed,
he maintains that freedom is: "That one has the will to self-
responsibility. "15 For Nietzsche a person is responsible and punishable
for his or her deeds because these deeds are the self and proceed from a
person's concrete make-up of habits, desires, and purposes. If our
actions are caused by some arbitrary force, agent, or substratum,
outside the individual person as he actually is, then there is no reason to
hold the concrete individual responsible. Freedom and responsibility
require an identification of self and deed; an awareness of ourselves as
being our deeds. The traditional conception of freedom is false because
it separates the self from its acts and thereby makes responsibility
impossible.1 6
With this background we can easily understand Nietzsche's claim
that those who reject the doctrine of a free-will must also reject the
notion of an unfree-will. An unfree-will would be a subject or ego that is
determined to act by heredity or environn1ent or past character. In any
case, the assumption employed by both indeterminists and determinists
alike is that there is a distinction between a doer and a deed. For
Nietzsche, however, there is no such distinction. "The 'thing-in-itself' is
nonsensical. If I remove all relationships, all the 'properties,' all the
'activities, ' of a thing, the thing does not remain over; because thingness
has only been invented by us owing to the requirements oflogic ...."17
Once the "I" as underlying substratum is abandoned both traditional
doctrines of a free and an unfree will must be abandoned too, and that is
precisely what Nietzsehe does.
We are almost ready to turn to Nietzsche's own view offreedom, but
before we do let us summarize the main points of his attack on the
conception of freedom he rejects. A freedom that requires an ego as
cause does not exist because (i) it creates a false dichotomy between
doer and deed. (ii) It becomes impossible to hold a person responsible,
accountable, or punishable for his actions. And (iii) as I shall
substantiate in Part 11, it views freedom as something that we possess at
creation rather than something that is a process and consequence of
activity, development, and growth.
II. NIETZSCHE'S POSITIVE VIEW OF FREEDOM
Although Nietzsche has many disparaging things to say about
freedom in the substantialist sense, there can be no doubt that he
believes that it is possible to become free; that freedom is a realizable
ideal. Thus, the issue we must now consider is in what sense this is so.
What is freedom and how is the existence of free-spirits possible,
according to Nietzsche? The key to unraveling the answers to these
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questions lies, I believe, in the idea that freedom is not something that
we antecedently possess, but that it is son1ething we can acquire through
a difficult and painful process of overcoming. Our will or spirit becomes
free as we fully realize and develop our will to power, or synonomously,
our instinct to freedom. As I understand it, our will, drive, or instinct to
power or freedom has as its goal or ainl the creation of something that is
truly one's own, a monument to one's uniqueness. It also aims at
self-mastery; the mastery that comes through being able to set goals for
oneself and then overcome the obstacles that might interfere with their
realization. Ultimately, the obstacles that stand in the way of realizing
our instinct or will to freedom are to be found within. Thus, individuals
who can gain control over their own life, "those who give themselves
their own law, those who create themselves! ",18 they are the ones who
are most fully realizing the fundamt~ntal instinct that, according to
Nietzsche, manifests itself in everything we do.
The fundamental will of the spirit is to continually create a new self by
surpassing the old. The process of overcoming the old self by
continually setting new goals upon the attainment of the old is a process
of growth, and in the process of growth freedom is to be found. As
Nietzsche says:
That imperious something which is popularly called Hthe spirit," wishes to be master
internally and externally, and to feel itself master; .... Its object thereby is the
incorporation of new Hexperience," the sortment of new things in the old arrangements-
in short, growth; or more properly, the feeling of growth, the feeling of increased
power-is its object. 19
What sort of change, then, is growth? And under what conditions does
growth take place?
Nietzsche says that the free, very free spirits grow under special
conditions where "the dangerousness of his situation had to be
increased enormously. "20 For Nietzsche, growth, "involves the
dangerous privilege of living experimentally"21 continually taking risks
and at every step of the way accepting responsibility for one's actions
through a realization that I am those actions. To live dangerously or
experimentally involves a continual process of striving toward goals
and upon their attainn1ent creating ne'w ones and with them a new self.
Thus Spoke Zarathustra: I teach you the superman. Man is something that should be
overcome. What have you done to overcome him?22
In the same vain he says:
And life itself told men this secret: 'Behold, ' it said, 'I am that which must overcome itself
again and again. ( ) Whatever 1 create and however much 1 love
it-soon 1 have to oppose it and my love: thus will my will have it. '23
The free-spirit is a creating, shaping~, changing power whose tireless
process of recreation resists the temptation to rest on one 's laureIs or to
be an imitator or parasite of others.
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Unfortunately, as Nietzsche sees it, the process of change that defines
growth is a painful one. For individuals who want to stand out from the
crowd and distinguish their evaluations from the evaluations of others
are punished and made to feel guilty. With each level of guilt the fetters
and bonds of obligation become all but unbreakable. Thus, the
exhilaration that results from breaking away from theology and
traditional morality is accompanied by pain and sickness. When one
liberates oneself, there exists
A sudden terror and suspicion of what it loved, a lightning bolt of contempt for what it
called 'duty', ... perhaps a hot blush of shame at what it has just done and at the same
time an exultation that it has done it, a drunken inwardly exultant shudder which betrays
that a victory has been won ... such bad and painful things are part of the history ofthe
great liberation. It is at the same time a sickness that can destroy the man who has it, this
first outbreak of strength and will to self-determination, to evaluating on one's own
account, this will tofree-will: and how much sickness is expressed in the wild experiments
and singularities through which the liberated prisoner now seeks to demonstrate his
mastery over things. 24
In spite of the pain, the development of a mature freedom of spirit is
worth it for those who have the strength to engage in it. For only by
overcoming ourselves again and again can we most fully realize our
instinct to freedom and come to have an awareness of ourselves as "the
new, the unique, the incomparable, those who give themselves their own
law, those who create themselves! "25
My interpretation of Nietzsche on freedom is, to a considerable
degree, based on his equating the will to power with the instinct to
freedom. 26 Since Nietzsche also identifies the will to truth with the will
to power, what he says about "truth" can serve to further clarify and
strengthen my interpretation of his view of freedom. Consider the
following passage:
"Truth" is therefore not something there, that might be found or discovered-but
something that must be created and that gives a name to a process, or rather to a will to
overcome that has in itself no end-introducing truth, as a processus in infinitum, an
active determining-not a becoming-conscious of something that is in itself firm and
determined. It is a word for the will to power. 27
Like truth, freedom is not something that is bestowed upon an enduring
individual or ego before it acts. Rather, freedom is something that must
be acquired through a process of self-determination. The self, like truth,
is plastic and malleable-a multiplicity-and not a fixed block of
identity. The self does not become free by introducing freedom as a
concrete goal to be attained. On the contrary, free will is created
through the process of determining or willing tasks that it shall strive to
accomplish. Furthermore, freedom involves a recognition that upon the
completion of our goals we must immediately set about to surpass the
self that we have just become, and accept responsibility for the past
actions we are, and the future actions we will be.
217
On the basis of the preceding int(~rpretationof Nietzsche's positive
view of freedom we can now reconcile his seemingly paradoxical
statements concerning freedom. In so far as "freedom" involves (1) a
distinction between subject or self and act or deed, and (2) some simple
faculty of free-will that a substance possesses, freedom does not exist,
there is no free-will. Of course, there is no unfree-will either since, for
Nietzsche, the concept of "subject" or "substance" as caused or
uncaused is false or nonsensical. On the other hand, if we eliminate the
notion of substratum and identify will and deed, then freedom can be
understood as a relationship between the successive deeds that constitute
a person's choices. When properly understood, "freedom" means
"growth" and to grow is to improve, to change, to actively transform the
existent situation so as to overcome the obstacles that stand in the way
of accomplishing the future that we choose for ourselves. Although
freedom, as Nietzsche conceives of it, can be achieved only through a
mixture of the pleasure of self-realization,or self-glorification, and the
pain of breaking out of the chains of one's past, it is achievable. Thus,
once we distinguish the substantialist conception of freedom from
Nietzsche's, his seemingly inconsistent remarks concerning freedom can
be reconciled.
Although the main task of this paper has been accomplished, it may
be objected that the tentative coherence of Nietzsche's view of freedom
may be pulled apart when we compare his doctrine offreedom with his
position on values. In the next and final section, I shall argue that there
is a conflict between Nietzsche's views on freedom and value, but that it
is precisely this conflict or paradox that enables the great and truly free
spirit to emerge.
111. FREEDOM AND VALUES
The coherence of Nietzsche's views on freedom and values is
threatened by the consequence that they appear to imply that freedom is
and is not a realizable possibility. To see why this is so let us first note
that his scepticism and perspectivism entail that nothing is really
valuable or even really true. For our purposes the following passages
are crucial:
Every belief is the considering-something-true. The most extreme form of nihilism would
be the view that every belief, every considering-something-true, is necessarily false
because there simply is no true world. Thus, a perspectival appearance whose origin lies in
us ....28
And again,
Judgments, judgments of value, concerning life, ... can, in the end, never be true ... in
themselves such judgments are stupidities. 29
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We may infer from these passages that Nietzsche would maintain that
all judgments of value are false. In other words, any belief that one
course of action rather than another is more valuable or nl0rally
preferable is false. He holds this view because he rejects the possibility of
there being areal world that could provide an objective ground for
judgments of value. Unfortunately, when we combine Nietzsche's
scepticism with his claim that freedom is realizable a paradox may be
thought to ensue. For the possibility of freedom depends on the
possibility of making decisions and choices, that is, if we cannot choose
then we are not free. However, in a world in which all valu~ judgments
are false, that is, in a world in which there are no values, it can be argued
that it is impossible to choose and thus, that it is impossible to be free.
To see what is involved in this last point consider that at present I am
faced with the decision to continue writing this paper or to start walking
out of my study. Clearly, if I choose to continue writing this paper it is
because I place greater value on that act than I do on the alternative. In
situations where a choice between two opposing actions is necessary, it
is ultimately based upon our believing that what we are doing is in some
sense more valuable than the alternative. Without that belief choice
would be impossible. But for Nietzsche, "great spirits are skeptics. "30
The man of faith, the believer, is necessarily a small type of man. Hence, 'freedom of spirit'
i.e., unbeliefas an instinct is a precondition of greatness. 31
Thus, free spirits will doubt, not believe that the choices they make are
more valuable than the alternatives, and consequently, a "free" spirit
would find it impossible to choose, that is, he would be unfree.
A critic might object that it is possible to make a choice even if one
does not believe that what one is choosing has value since one can make
an arbitrary choice. Admittedly, one can act arbitrarily, but Nietzsche
would certainly not regard such decisions as free. For arbitrary or
capricious choices would not represent a personal commitment to a
goal, but would merely be a sign of your upbringing, and the influence
of the valuations of others.
What, then, is a free choice? And how is a free choice possible in a
world without value? The idea that a free choice i~ a subjective choice,
that is, a choice based upon one 's own self-created values is on the right
track, but insufficient as it stands. For the free spirit understands that if
all judgments of value are false, then even his own. subjective value
judgments are false, and so at one level cannot serve the purpose for
which they were introduced, namely, to guide us in our actions and to be
the foundation of our choices.
Nietzsche recognizes that the freedom left for the powerful individual
who sets out on his own course without anything to base his decisions
on except himself is a cagelike freedom. He says:
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Horizon: infinity-We have left land and taken to our ship! We have burned our bridges
more, we have burned our land behind us! Now, little ship, take care! The ocean lies all
around you; true, it is not always roaring, and sometimes it lies there as if it were silken and
golden and a gentle favorable dream. But then:: will be times when you will know that it is
infinite and that there is nothing more terrible than infinity .... Alas, ifhomesickness for
land should assail you, as if there were more freedom there-and there is no longer any
'land',32
The ship represents man and the land burned behind us represents
objective values. We are thus faced with having to make a choice in an
infinite sea that contains no path or road marked out as the right one.
Has not the infinity of the sea, our lTIOnstrous and infinite freedom,
become too much to bear? Has not our infinite freedom become an
unfreedom? Indeed it hase F or, as the preceding quotation suggests,
there is a paradox in Nietzsche's conc(~ptionsoffreedom and value that
he does not attempt to rationalize away.33
Nevertheless, the truly free individual can overcome the paradox of
freedom if he has the will to assurne responsibility for self-created values
by living in accordance with them. Th(~ powerful individual on the road
to self-nlastery and in the midst of the process of growth, has the
strength to both acknowledge and go beyond the contradiction inherent
in decision making. Earlier I quoted a passage wherein Nietzsche writes
of the terror and pain that result from breaking the bond to custom and
duty, and in the same passage he goes on to say that
From this morbid isolation, from the desert ofthese years oftenlptation and experiment,
it is still a long road to that tremendous overflowing certainty and health which may not
dispense even with sickness, as a means and fish-hook of knowledge, so that mature
freedom of spirit which is equally self-mastery and discipline of the heart and permits
access to many contradictory modes of thought ....34
The mature freedom of spirit, the individual who achieves a measure of
freedom, is what Nietzsche calls a "manly sceptic." He is aware that the
path that he sets hinlself on is not objectively true or right, but depends
entirely on his perspective and so is a path for which he alone is entirely
responsible.
We see, then, that the process of beoming free consists in facing the
fact about values, realizing that there are no objective values, and yet
overcoming that fact by positing goals that form the basis for the
growth and development of a life of personal value and personal
significance. For Nietzsche,
The scepticism of daring manliness, which is closely related to the genius for war and
conquest, ... despises and nevertheless grasps; it undermines and takes possession; it
does not believe, but it does not thereby lose itself; it gives the spirit a dangerous liberty,
but it keeps guard over the heart. 35
Such dangerous and sceptical choices are truly free since they require
the individual who makes them to be aware of hirnself as an existent, as
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an individual qua individual, and not merely as a specimen of the
abstract kind humanity.
A fully developed freedom does not stop, but continues to create new
values over and over again, opening oneself up to new and different
challenges. As he says:
the power to create new and even personal eyes for oneself and again new and even more
personaIones; so that for man alone there is no eternally fixed horizon and perspectives. 36
If we realize our power to create new and even more personal goals and
we recognize and act in accordance with the belief that growth is a
processus in infinitum, then and only then can each of us become free. 37
NOTES
1 Nietzsche, Human, All Too Human, in A Nietzsehe Reader, (hereafter N R) ed. and
trans. R.J. Hollingdale (Great Britain: Penguin Books, 1979),39. In each ofthe following
citations from Nietzsche's works the number references will not be to a page but to a
section or aphorism so that any edition may be consulted. See also, Human, All Too
Human, 102, 107.
2 Nietzsche, The Gay Seienee, in NR, 343.
3 Nietzsche, Twilight 0/ the Idols, in The Portable Nietzsehe, ed. and trans. Walter
Kaufmann (New York: Viking Press, 1965), "What the Germans Lack," 38.
4 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, in The Philosophy 0/ Nietzsehe, trans. Helen
Zimmern (New York: Modern Library, 1954),21.
,230.
5 The Will to Power, trans. by Walter Kaufmann and R.J. Hollingdale and ed. by
Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage Books, 1968), 488.
6 Nietzsche, The Genealogy 0/ Morals, in The Philosophy 0/Nietzsehe, op. eil., trans.
Horace B. Samuel, I, 13.
7 Ibid., I, 13.
8 The Will to Power, 488.
9 The Will to Power, 490.
10 Nietzsche, Human, All Too Human, in NR, 23.
11 Ibid., 23.
12 Ibid., 23; emphasis added.
13 Ibid., 23.
14 Ibid., 23.
15 Twilight 0/ the Idols, "What the Germans Lack," 38.
16 This same point is made by John Dewey in "The Ego as Cause," The Early Works,
Vol. 4: 1893-1894 (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1971), pp. 91-95.
17 The Will to Power, 558.
18 The Gay Scienee, 335.
19 Beyond Good and Evil, 230.
20 Beyond Good and Evil, 44.
21 Human, All Too Human, Pre/aee 3.
22 Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Preface 4.
23 Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, in N R, 11, Of "Self-Overcoming".
24 Human, All Too Human, Pre/aee 3, emphasis added.
25 The Gay Seienee, 335.
26 See, On the Genealogy 0/ Morals, 11,17, 18.
27 The Will to Power, 552.
28 Ibid., 15.
221
29 Twilight of the Idols, "The Problem of Socrates," 3.
30 Nietzsche, The Antichrist, in The Portable Nietzsehe, op. cit., 54.
31 The Will to Power, 963. See also, The Antichrist, 54. An excellent discussion of
Nietzsche's skepticism is found in Adi Parush, "Nietzsche on the Skeptic's Life," Review
of Metaphysics, 29 (March, 1976), pp. 523-542.
32 The Gay Seience, 124.
33 A different, more intractable paradox arises in Nietzsche's philosophy. For he
maintains, on the one hand, that freedom is something that we ought to strive to become;
and, on the other, that there is nothing, objectively speaking, that we ought to do. A full
discussion of this issue cannot be made here, but two brief remarks are in order. First, to
show that a philosopher is inconsistent implies that one of his positions is false, not that
both are. Thus, Nietzsche's view of freedom as I have interpreted it may be internally
consistent and true, even though his philosophy as a whole is incoherent. Second, one
might attempt to avoid the paradox by arguing, as Bernd Magnus does, that Nietzsche is
rejecting the traditional picture of philosophy as the attempt to discover the truth about
perennial questions, to solve them or to help the enterprise progress toward their solution.
(See B. Magnus, "Perfectibility and Attitude in Nietzsche's Übermensch," Review of
Metaphysics, 36 (March, 1983), pp. 633-659.) On Magnus' interpretation, Nietzsche is not
offering us a new improved theory of morality, since there is no objective reality that could
form the basis of such a morality or of any other philosophical truth. Thus, the
Übermensch, or truly free spirit does not represent Nietzsche's vision of the human ideal
ofwhat human beings shouldbe like. Rather, Magnus suggests that "an Übermensch is a
representation only of a particular attitude toward life, that it articulates a certain form of
life. The attitude toward life which is captured is the expression of nihilism already
overcome." (pp. 634-635) Perhaps, then, one could avoid an inconsistency in Nietzsche's
views on freedom and morality by interpreting freedom as an attitude toward life that
embodies continual striving.
34 Human, All Too Human, Preface 4.
35 Beyond Good and Evil, 209. See also 210..
36 The Gay Science, 143.
37 Interestingly, John Dewey's positive views of freedom are remarkably similar to
Nietzsche's. Compare, for example, "Self-Realization as the Moral Ideal," pp. 42-53, and
The Study of Ethics: A Syllabus, Pt. 11, Sec. 8, "Freedom and Responsibility," both in
The Early Works, op. eit. See also, Reconstruction in Philosophy(Boston: Beacon Press,
1957), and "Philosophies of Freedom," in On Experience, Nature, and Freedom (New
York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1960), pp. 261-287.
222
